Modules and brain mapping by Friston, Karl J. & Price, Cathy J.
Modules and brain mapping
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This review highlights the key role of modularity and the additive factors method in functional
neuroimaging. Our focus is on structure–function mappings in the human brain and how these are
disclosed by brain mapping. We describe how modularity of processing (and possibly processes)
was a key point of reference for establishing functional segregation as a principle of brain organization.
Furthermore, modularity plays a crucial role when trying to characterize distributed brain responses in
terms of functional integration or coupling among brain areas. We consider additive factors logic and
how it helped to shape the design and interpretation of studies at the inception of brain mapping, with
a special focus on factorial designs. We look at factorial designs in activation experiments and in the
context of lesion–deﬁcit mapping. In both cases, the presence or absence of interactions among
various experimental factors has proven essential in understanding the context-sensitive nature of
distributed but modular processing and discerning the nature of (potentially degenerate) structure–
function relationships in cognitive neuroscience.
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This review is essentially a narrative about how
some of the fundaments of experimental design
and interpretation of human brain mapping
studies have developed over the past two decades.
Its focus is on the role of modularity and additive
factors logic in guiding these developments. This
is a somewhat self-referential account, which
allows us to describe how our earlier misconcep-
tions gave way to more enduring perspectives—
perspectives that help guide our current research
into structure–function relationships in the brain.
This review comprises four sections. The ﬁrst
considers, brieﬂy, the rationale for modularity
and its place within distributed neuronal proces-
sing architectures. We consider evolutionary
imperatives for modularity and then a slightly
more abstract treatment that underpins the analy-
sis of functional and effective connectivity. The
second section is a short historical perspective
that covers the rise and fall of cognitive subtraction
and the emergence of factorial designs in neuroi-
maging. Our focus here is on the role of additive
factors logic and the connection to conjunction
analyses in neuroimaging. The third section
pursues the importance of interactions in factorial
designs—speciﬁcally, their role in disclosing
context-sensitive interactions or coupling among
modular brain areas. We illustrate this using the
notion of dynamic diaschisis and psychophysiolo-
gical interactions. The ﬁnal section turns to
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the sense of using lesions to infer functional archi-
tectures). Here, we review the concept of necessary
and sufﬁcient brain systems for a given task and
how these led to the appreciation of degenerate
structure–function mappings. Additive factors
logic again plays a key role but, in this instance,
the combination rule (Sternberg, 2011 this issue)
becomes probabilistic and acquires a multiplicative
aspect. We rehearse the importance of degenerate
mappings in the context of multilesion–deﬁcit
analysis and conclude with some comments on
the role of cognitive ontologies in making the
most of neuroimaging data.
In defence of modularity
Most neurobiologists who are sensitive to the dis-
tributed and self-organized nature of neuronal
dynamics tend to distance themselves from func-
tionalist accounts of modularity. However, there
is a growing appreciation of the importance of
modularity in network theory (e.g., Bullmore &
Sporns, 2009; He & Evans, 2010; Valencia et al.,
2009) and the study of complex systems in
general. The importance of modularity is usually
cast in terms of robustness and evolvability in an
evolutionary setting (e.g., Calabretta, 2007;
Redies & Puelles, 2001). At ﬁrst glance, robust-
ness might appear to limit the evolvability of
biological networks, because it reduces the
number of genetic variations that are expressed
phenotypically (and upon which natural selection
can act; Sporns, 2010). However, neutral
mutations, which are expressed in a phenotypically
neutral way, can promote evolution by creating
systems that are genetically varied but function
equally well (i.e., degenerate, many-to-one map-
pings between genotype and functional pheno-
type). In brief, “robustness implies that many
mutations are neutral and such neutrality fosters
innovation” (Wagner, 2005 p. 1773). Both robust-
ness and evolvability are enhanced by the modular
organization of biological systems—from gene and
protein networks to complex processes in develop-
ment (e.g., Duffau, 2006). The dissociability
or decomposability afforded by modularity is
characteristic of the brain’s small world connec-
tivity architecture, a feature that has received
increasing empirical support from analyses of ana-
tomical and functional connectivity (Bullmore &
Sporns, 2009). In short, modularity may be an
emergent characteristic of any biological network
that has been optimized by selective pressure (irre-
spective of the particular constraints on adaptive
ﬁtness). Interestingly, these arguments about
modularity have emerged in a ﬁeld one might
least expect—namely, network theory.
The role of network theory (and graph theory)
isalso central to the way that imaging neuroscience
tries to assess functional brain architectures. In
brief, the brain appears to adhere to two principles
of organization: functional segregation and inte-
gration. Functional segregation refers to the
specialization of brain regions for a particular cog-
nitive or sensorimotor function, where that func-
tion is anatomically segregated within a cortical
area or system. Functional integration refers to
the coupling and interactions (message passing)
among these areas (Friston, Frith, Liddle, &
Frackowiak, 1993). The mathematical description
of networks like the brain often appeals to graph
theory, where the interactions among regions
(nodes) are encoded by connections (edges).
These connections imply a conditional depen-
dency between the (usually hidden) states of each
region. In the brain, these hidden states corre-
spond to population or ensemble neuronal activity
performing computations. The key point here is
that, to understand the network, one has to ident-
ify where there are no connections. This may
sound paradoxical but emphasizes the importance
of conditional independencies. Conditional inde-
pendence means that knowing the activity of one
area tells you nothing about the activity of a
second area, given the activity in all other areas.
If this can be shown statistically, one can infer
the absence of a connection between the two
areas in question. This absence endows the graph
with a sparsity structure and a speciﬁc sort of archi-
tecture. The very existence of conditional indepen-
dencies induces modularity and becomes the
ultimate aim of network and effective connectivity
analyses in neuroimaging.
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reﬂected in the ﬁrst sentence of Sternberg (2011
this issue): “The ﬁrst step in one approach to
understanding a complex process is to attempt to
divide into modules; parts that are independent
in some sense.” Mathematically, this “sense” is a
conditional independence.
A key example of a connectivity analysis is
dynamic causal modelling (DCM), in which one
is trying to explain observed neuronal responses
in terms of an underlying Bayesian dependency
graph (Friston, Harrison, & Penny, 2003). In
DCM, the dependencies are modelled in terms
of the effective connectivity between hidden neur-
onal states in each brain area. Model selection is
then used to identify the architecture that best
explains the systems response, using Bayesian
model selection. The very fact that one character-
izes distributed responses in terms of a set of con-
nected regions (nodes) speaks to the implicit
modularity of processing within each node. See
Figure 1 (and Seghier & Price, 2010) for an
example of dynamic causal modelling in addres-
sing the modular but distributed architectures
underlying reading and object naming. It should
be noted, however, that the dependencies can
themselves be context sensitive. In other words,
being modular does not mean responding to the
same inputs in the same way all the time.
Understanding this context sensitivity is one of
the most important aspects of network and
causal modelling, especially in cognitive
Figure 1. An example of how dynamic causal modelling (DCM) can address modular and distributed architectures. This DCM includes ﬁve
regions that are commonly activated during reading and picture naming. The results of the DCM analysis show that the connection from
visual recognition areas (pOT/aOT) to articulatory areas (PrC), via the putamen, is stronger for reading than for object naming
(Seghier & Price, 2010).
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this later but ﬁrst consider how the key regions
(nodes) in casual modelling are identiﬁed in the
ﬁrst place.
Additive factors logic and context sensitivity
Prior to the inception of modern brain mapping,
the principle of functional segregation was a
hypothesis, based upon decades of careful electro-
physiological and anatomical research (Zeki &
Shipp, 1988). Within months of the introduction
of whole-brain activation studies, the selective
activation of functionally segregated brain areas
was evident, and the hypothesis became a principle
(e.g., Zeki et al., 1991). It is interesting to look
back at how these activation maps were obtained
experimentally: Most early brain mapping studies
used an elaboration of Donder’s subtractive
method (e.g., Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, &
Raichle, 1988). Put simply, this entailed adding a
process to a task and subtracting the evoked
brain activity to reveal the activation due to the
extra processing. Our ﬁrst misconception was
that one could associate the brain activation with
the added process.
This interpretation of an activation rests upon
the assumption of pure insertion—namely, that
the extra process can be inserted purely without
changing existing processes or eliciting new pro-
cesses (or processing). The pure insertion assump-
tion is very similar to the additivity assumption in
the combination of factors in the additive factors
method (Sternberg, 2011, this issue). In other
words, it is necessary to exclude interactions
between the old and new task factors before associ-
ating any brain activation with the new task com-
ponent. To address this empirically, one needs a
factorial design in which one can test for the inter-
actions (Friston et al., 1996). The adoption of fac-
torial designs—and the ability to assess
interactions in neuroimaging experiments—was
incredibly important and allowed people to
examine the context-sensitive nature of the acti-
vations, in the sense of quantifying the dependency
of the activation due to one factor on that of
another. Factorial designs are now the mainstay
of experimental design in neuroimaging.
Certainly, in our unit, it has been nearly a decade
since we have used a design that had fewer than
two factors. Indeed, at the time of writing, a
search on PubMed.gov for “interaction AND
brain AND (fMRI OR PET)” yielded 1,854
results, while a search for “subtraction AND
brain AND (fMRI OR PET)” gave only 1,615.
Figure 2a shows a simple example of a factorial
design and a test for a regionally speciﬁc inter-
action, again focusing on the processes underlying
reading and object naming.
Cognitive subtraction and process
decomposition
As described carefully by Sternberg (2011, this
issue), there is a key distinction between cognitive
subtraction and process decomposition. In cogni-
tive subtraction, one changes the task in a qualitat-
ive way to induce a new putative processing
component. Conversely, in process decomposition,
the task remains the same but the stimuli or
context is changed in a multifactorial way. This
circumvents the assumption of pure insertion,
while affording the opportunity to test for inter-
actions. As noted in Sternberg (2011 this issue)
“with a composite measure factorial experiments
are essential, to assess how the effects of the
factors combine”. Neuronal responses are, by
their nature, composite, in the sense that they
reﬂect the processing of multiple processing
elements. Figure 2b provides an example of a fac-
torial design where stimulus factors were varied
parametrically to reveal an interaction or depen-
dency between name frequency and stimulus
modality (pictures or written names). Much of
the additive factors method rests upon excluding
an interaction to make inferences about the
decomposition of the underlying processes: If two
processes do not interact, they can be decomposed
functionally. Exactly the same logic underpins
cognitive conjunctions in neuroimaging (Price &
Friston, 1997). In cognitive conjunction analyses,
one tests for colocalized activation attributable to
two or more factors in the absence of an interaction.
Figure 2 provides a simple example of this
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PubMed.gov results for (cognitive AND conjunc-
tion) AND (fMRI OR PET OR neuroimaging).
However, in the context of brain mapping, inter-
actionscanbeextremelyinformativeaboutneuronal
processing and are usually used to infer the inte-
gration of inputs from two or more modules
(brain regions). This can be essential in under-
standing the coupling among brain regions and
the nature of hierarchical and recursive message
passing among and within levels of sensory proces-
sing hierarchies. We pursue this theme in the
context of changes in coupling below.
Context-sensitive coupling
In the same way that factorial designs disclose
interactions in terms of regional processing, they
Figure 2. Factorial designs in brain activation experiments. (a) An example of a simple factorial design that uses the interaction to identify
regions where differences between naming and semantic categorization are greater for pictures of objects than for their written names. (b)
Regions identiﬁed by the interaction and conjunction (unpublished data). (c) An example of a factorial parametric design that uses the
interaction to identify regions where the effect of a parametric factor (e.g., word frequency) is stronger for naming than for reading. (d)
Hypothetical data illustrating an interaction. To view a colour version of this ﬁgure, please see the online issue of the Journal.
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coupling between brain areas. Interactions simply
mean a difference in a difference (e.g., how a
response to one factor depends upon the response
to another). If we replace one (psychological)
factor with the (physiological) activity in a seed
or reference brain area, then the ensuing inter-
action becomes a psychophysiological interaction
(PPI; Friston et al., 1997). Roughly speaking,
this PPI reports a signiﬁcant change in the
(linear) inﬂuence of the seed region on any signiﬁ-
cant target region, with different levels of the
psychological factor. Although a simple analysis,
this has been exploited in a large number of neu-
roimaging studies to look at how coupling
between brain areas can change with brain state
or set—with 222 PubMed.gov results for (psycho-
physiological interaction OR PPI) AND (fMRI
OR PET OR imaging). The notion that connec-
tivity (and implicit modularity) is itself state and
activity dependent is crucial for understanding
the dynamic repertoire of real brain networks.
Furthermore, it reiterates the importance of
thinking about modular function in a context-
sensitive way.
This becomes important in a pragmatic sense
when one tries to understand the remote effect
of brain lesions on brain activity and responses.
This is usually referred to in terms of diaschisis
(from Greek, meaning “shocked throughout”). A
particular form of diaschisis can emerge when
the remote effect of a lesion is itself context depen-
dent—in other words, where there is an abnormal-
ity of evoked responses, due to a remote lesion that
is revealed in, and only in, some speciﬁc tasks or
brain states. This has been referred to as
“dynamic diaschisis” (Price, Warburton, Moore,
Frackowiak, & Friston, 2001) and underscores
the subtleties in understanding highly
context-dependent and nonlinear exchanges
between modular brain regions. An example of
dynamic diaschisis is shown in Figure 3. In the
ﬁnal section, we pursue the effect of brain
lesions on evoked responses and look more
closely at the notion of modularity and segre-
gation, in the context of structure–function
relationships.
Modularity, structure, and function
For many people, the goal of neuroimaging is to
understand the functional architecture of the
brain in relation to particular tasks or cognitive
processing. This understanding entails knowledge
of the mapping between the brain’s structure and
its function. An important complement to brain
activation studies are lesion–deﬁcit studies. Here
brain imaging is used to deﬁne a regionally speciﬁc
brain insult, and its implicit functional specializ-
ation is inferred from the associated behavioural
deﬁcit. Many people in neuroimaging have noted
the importance of the complimentary contri-
butions of functional and structural imaging. For
example, identifying a regionally speciﬁc lesion,
in the context of a behavioural deﬁcit, suggests
that this region was necessary for performance.
Initially, it was hoped that a combination of
lesion–deﬁcit mapping and functional activation
studies would identify necessary and sufﬁcient
brain regions for a particular task or process
(Price, Mummery, Moore, Frackowiak, &
Friston, 1999). However, this ambition quickly
turned out to be misguided: This is because it
overlooked the ubiquitous many-to-one (degener-
ate) mapping between structure and function in
biological networks (Edelman & Gally, 2001).
Put simply, this means that two or more areas
could fulﬁl the same task requirements.
Extending this notion to high-order combinato-
rics means that there may be no necessary brain
area for any particular process and therefore no
“necessary and sufﬁcient brain area”. This was a
fundamental insight, which mandated a
revision of (our) approaches to lesion–deﬁcit
mapping and activation studies (Price & Friston,
2002).
Crucially, the possibility of degenerate
structure–function mappings brings us back to
factorial designs and additive factors logic. One
can see this simply by considering the difference
between two structure–function relationships: In
the ﬁrst mapping, processing is distributed over
two regions (nodes). This means that damage to
the ﬁrst or the second will produce a deﬁcit.
Now consider the degenerate case, where either
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FRISTON AND PRICEFigure 3. An example of dynamic diaschisis (unpublished data). Following a lesion to the left putamen (see Figure 1), activation in the left
precentral cortex (PrC in Figure 1) is abnormally low during successful reading but normally activated during successful object naming. This is
consistent with the dynamic causal modelling (DCM) results reported in Figure 1 and suggests that PrC activation is driven by left putamen
activation during reading but not naming. See Figure 2a for details of Conditions A, B, C, and D. To view a colour version of this ﬁgure,
please see the online issue of the Journal.
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to the ﬁrst and second area will cause a deﬁcit. If
we assume that the deﬁcit is a pure measure of
the assumed process in question, then we have
two fundamentally different (multiplicative) com-
bination rules within additive factors logic. In the
ﬁrst situation (deﬁcit following lesions to ﬁrst or
second area), the probability of a deﬁcit p(D|L) is
equal to one minus the probability that they are
both undamaged, which is the product of the
probability that neither are lesioned.
p(D|L)=1−[1−p(L1=1)][1−p(L2=1)] (1a)
Conversely, under the degenerate mapping, the
probability of a deﬁcit becomes the probability of
a lesion in either area, leading to a very different
combination rule:
p(D|L)=p(L1 = 1)p(L2 = 1)( 1b)
Figure 4. An example of degeneracy. Reading is impaired following lesions that damage the left putamen, left insula, and left parietal cortex
inclusively (Patient 3). However, damage to only one of these regions does not impair reading (Patients 1 and 2). The results suggest that
reading can be supported either by a pathway that involves the parietal cortex or by a pathway that involves the putamen/insula. When one
pathway is damaged, the other pathway can support reading. When both pathways are damaged, reading is impaired. This previously
unpublished result is consistent with a study of reading aloud in healthy subjects (Seghier, Lee, Schoﬁeld, Ellis, & Price, 2008) that
showed an inverse relationship (across participants) between activation in the left putamen and parietal cortex. Together, the results from
patient studies (above) and healthy subjects (Seghier et al., 2008) suggest that the putamen and parietal cortex are components of
different reading pathways and that either one or the other is needed for successful reading.
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two scenarios we need a factorial design, in which
we can lesion (or obtain access to patients with
lesions in) one area L1 = 1 and the other area
L2 = 1. In short, we need a multilesion analysis.
This provides an important and principled motiv-
ation for studying patients with different brain
lesions (and has implications for traditional
single-case studies in neuropsychology). Figure 4
shows an example of degeneracy inferred using
this Boolean logic associated with degenerate struc-
ture–function mappings. Interestingly, a classical
one-to-one structure–function mapping implies
that p(Di|L)=p(Li = 1)⇒p(Di|L)=p(Di|Li),
whichmeansthedeﬁcitisconditionallyindependent
of lesion Lk [ {0,1} : ∀k = i in all other areas.
There are many interesting issues that attend
the analysis of multilesions studies. However, we
close by noting that a truly inclusive approach to
modularity and structure–function mappings in
the human brain will account for both lesion–
deﬁcit data and functional activation studies. In
short, our empirical and conceptual models of
brain architecture have to explain both evoked
responses due to experimental manipulations in
activation studies and the behavioural deﬁcits eli-
cited by selective lesions. Clearly, these models
entail a precise speciﬁcation of the mapping
between neuronal activity and cognitive function.
This mapping is itself a holy grail of cognitive
neuroscience, which has been referred to as a cog-
nitive ontology (Poldrack, 2006; Price & Friston,
2005). Indeed, cognitive ontologies are now
becoming a major focus of the brain imaging and
cognitive neuroscience community, particularly
with the advent of new neuroinformatics tools
(Poldrack, Halchenko, & Hanson, 2009). One
can see how the combination of data from differ-
ent modalities and different patients acquires a
principled motivation from the arguments above.
In conclusion, the arguments and developments
discussed in this review rest explicitly on the
notion of modular but coupled brain regions and
the additive factors method (with linear or
nonlinear combination rules), introduced by
Sternberg (2011 this issue).
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